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Comment
MARYLAND v. KING: SACRIFICING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO BUILD UP THE DNA DATABASE
STEPHANIE B. NORONHA*
In Maryland v. King,1 a sharply divided United States Supreme Court
held that a Maryland law allowing warrantless collection of genetic
information from people who have been arrested for, but not convicted of,
serious crimes does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches.2 While the use of deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”)
evidence to convict or exonerate criminal defendants has increased steadily
over the past few decades,3 the Court’s decision in King has grave
implications for the collection of DNA from arrestees—people who are
supposed to be presumed innocent.4
Although DNA technology is undoubtedly a powerful crime fighting
tool,5 the King Court’s assessment of the DNA collection of arrestees under
the reasonableness balancing test6 is a misguided judicial response to the
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1. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
2. Id. at 1980.
3. WILSON J. WALL, GENETICS AND DNA TECHNOLOGY: LEGAL ASPECTS 20–21 (2002).
The use of DNA for criminal purposes was a direct offshoot of its use in medical research. Id. at
15. In 1984, while studying how inherited illnesses pass through families, English geneticist Alec
Jeffreys discovered, by chance, that particular regions of DNA contained repeating DNA
sequences. He quickly realized that these repeating sequences were highly variable and could be
used to distinguish individuals. Alec Jeffreys and Genetic Fingerprinting, UNIVERSITY OF
LEICESTER, http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/genetics/jeffreys (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. Sarah Hammond, The DNA Factor: June 2010, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS (June 2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/the-dna-factor.aspx (explaining the growing role of DNA evidence in criminal
investigations).
6. See infra Part I.A.
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immediate benefits of new technology, and it leaves room for government
abuse.7 Unlike searches of physical places and things, a search of
someone’s DNA is unique with respect to the physical intrusion necessary
to effectuate the search8 and the amount of data rendered by the search.9
While DNA searches require limited physical invasion of the human body,
they yield a considerable amount of aggregated data.10 Thus, these types of
searches are complex and require special consideration. The King Court,
however, wrongly applied the reasonableness balancing test.11 Instead, the
Court should have relied on a line of cases that involves searching data on
seized computers, which are more comparable to cases on collecting and
searching DNA data. If the Court had done so, the Court would have found
that similar to the requirement to obtain a search warrant to search data on
seized computers, the government should be required to obtain a search
warrant before entering an arrestee’s DNA profile into a DNA database to
search for a “hit.”12
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”13 Constantly advancing
technology has muddled the judiciary’s application of those words to reallife situations. DNA technology is one such example, and federal and state
courts have assessed the constitutionality of DNA collection under varying
tests14 and have disagreed as to whom DNA statutes apply.15

7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part II.A.2.
9. See infra Part II.A.3.
10. See infra Part II.A.3.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The full text reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id.
The Fourth Amendment is applicable to Maryland and every other state through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained as
a result of an unlawful search was “inadmissible in a state court”); see also infra Part I.A.
14. See infra Part I.B.1.
15. See infra Part I.B.2.
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A. Fourth Amendment Overview: Assessing “Reasonableness” Within
the Context of the Fourth Amendment
The U.S. Constitution prohibits only “unreasonable” searches.16 Thus,
once a court has determined that a government action is indeed a “search,”
triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of
the search must subsequently be determined. As Supreme Court Justice
Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence in Katz v. United States17 described, a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when the
government violates an individual’s “actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy,” and that expectation is one that society would acknowledge as
reasonable.18 A search warrant based on probable cause generally satisfies
the inquiry of whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment,19 although the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
“neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of
individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness
in every circumstance.”20 For example, in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n,21 the Court concluded that where a Fourth Amendment
intrusion serves “‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement,’” a court may “balance the governmental and privacy interests
to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable cause requirements in
the particular context.”22 In the event that adherence to the warrant and
probable cause requirements is impracticable, the search may be
constitutional under certain circumstances.23 In these situations, the
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). See
also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“[T]he ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.’” (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991))).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted this test in
Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 51–52, 59, 367 A.2d 949, 952, 956 (1977).
19. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (explaining that “[i]n
most criminal cases” where there was a valid warrant issued upon probable cause, the Court has
found reasonableness). The Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to demonstrate
to a neutral magistrate that they have probable cause to believe the search will reveal particular
evidence of a crime. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–15 (1948). In Illinois v. Gates,
the Supreme Court set out the modern “totality-of-the-circumstances” test for determining
probable cause. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Among other factors, this analysis takes into
consideration the basis of knowledge of the person supplying the information and whether the
information is trustworthy. Id. at 230.
20. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
21. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
22. Id. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
23. Id.
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Supreme Court has applied the “special needs” test in cases involving
school searches,24 searches of public employees,25 searches of probationers’
homes,26 and drug testing of individuals under certain circumstances.27
The Supreme Court has also applied a “reasonableness balancing test”
to warrantless searches, assessing reasonableness by weighing the invasion
of an individual’s privacy against the government’s interest.28 For example,
in United States v. Knights,29 the Court held that a warrantless search of a
probationer’s apartment, “supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized
by a condition of probation, was reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”30 Applying the reasonableness balancing test, the
Court concluded that Knights’ status as a probationer diminished his
reasonable expectation of privacy.31 This diminished expectation was
outweighed by the government’s interest in apprehending criminals.32
Five years later, the Supreme Court extended the Knights holding in
Samson v. California.33 The Court applied the same balancing test to
determine whether a suspicionless search of a parolee on a public street was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.34 The Court considered the
conditions for a parolee’s release, “including mandatory drug tests,
restrictions on [personal] association[s] . . . and mandatory meetings with
24. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985) (concluding that school officials
need not obtain a warrant nor have probable cause that a student under their authority has violated
the law prior to searching the student; rather, the legality of a search under such circumstances
should depend on “the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search”).
25. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987) (holding that “public employer
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances”).
26. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872–73, 875 (1987) (upholding a warrantless
search of a probationer’s home because of the government’s “special need” for “the exercise of
supervision to assure that the [probation] restrictions are in fact observed”).
27. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634 (upholding warrantless and suspicionless alcohol and drug
tests for railway employees); cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000)
(striking down an automobile checkpoint program “whose primary purpose was to detect evidence
of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” and explaining that this type of “‘general interest in crime
control’” may not qualify as a special need (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18
(1979))).
28. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117–19 (2001).
29. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
30. Id. at 122.
31. Id. at 119–20.
32. Id. at 119–22. The high recidivism rate of probationers also weighed against Knights’
privacy interest. Id. at 120.
33. 547 U.S. 843, 847, 857 (2006).
34. Id. at 846–47, 850–53.
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parole officers.”35
According to the Court, “parolees have fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to
imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.”36 The Court ultimately
held that the government’s interest in protecting society from future crime
outweighed the parolee’s already diminished expectation of privacy.37
B. Applying the Fourth Amendment to DNA Collection: An Overview
of Courts’ Analyses of DNA Collection Laws
In acknowledging the Fourth Amendment as a protector of “people,
not places,”38 the Supreme Court in Katz held that the warrantless
wiretapping of a public phone booth constituted an unreasonable search.39
That decision came at an important time in American history, when
technological advances facilitated intrusion, without physical trespass, into
many aspects of people’s lives.40 Technological advances in the forty-six
years since Katz have made it easier to invade someone’s privacy. As a
result, the Supreme Court now faces the difficult task of interpreting the
Fourth Amendment so that it can keep pace with rapid technological
innovations.
Recently in United States v. Jones,41 the Court confronted the question
of whether the government’s warrantless installation of an electronic
tracking device—a global positioning system (“GPS”)—on the car of a
suspect’s wife violated the Fourth Amendment.42 The government
monitored the GPS for twenty-eight days and collected more than two
thousand pages of data before arresting the suspect, Antoine Jones, for
trafficking narcotics.43 The Court held that the government’s actions
constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that
a warrantless search such as this one violated the Fourth Amendment.44

35. Id. at 851.
36. Id. at 850.
37. Id. at 852–54, 856–57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
39. Id. at 357–59.
40. See, e.g., Mark Silverstein, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Model for Illinois?,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 274 n.510 (1989) (“In the 1960’s [sic], public consciousness of new
threats to privacy grew as technological break-throughs made possible new kinds of previously
unknown surveillance.”).
41. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
42. Id. at 948–49.
43. Id. at 948.
44. Id. at 949. Although the Court found the government’s actions constituted a Fourth
Amendment “search,” the Court ultimately determined the case on common law trespass theory.
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In addition to powerful electronic tracking devices capable of
revealing a person’s location, the advent of technology made possible the
extraordinary ability to analyze a person’s genetic material. Numerous
federal court decisions leave little doubt that the collection of DNA and the
subsequent matching of the sample in a DNA database constitute a “search”
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.45 Federal and state courts, however,
disagree on several questions raised by the practice of collecting
individuals’ DNA, as well as its implications on Fourth Amendment rights.
First, although federal circuits almost unanimously upheld the
constitutionality of suspicionless DNA searches of convicted criminals,46
they assessed the constitutionality of DNA collection under different tests: a
majority of circuits applied the reasonableness balancing test, while a
minority of circuits applied the special needs test.47 Second, federal and
state courts disagreed as to whom the DNA statutes apply.48 Both federal
and state DNA collection laws now allow DNA collection from more than
just convicted criminals.49 Prior to the Court’s decision in King, federal and

Id. at 950–51. Thus, the Court declined to address the government’s argument that attachment
and use of the GPS device was nonetheless reasonable, even if it were a search. Id. at 954.
45. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989) (recognizing
that the collection and chemical testing of urine, blood, and breath samples constitute searches
under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The
government does not dispute the drawing of blood for purposes of DNA collection is a search
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005)
(concluding that “the extraction and analysis of [prisoners’] blood for DNA-indexing purposes
constituted a search implicating the Fourth Amendment”); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d
175, 182 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Requiring [an individual] to give a blood sample constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search.”); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The
Commissioner does not dispute that the statutorily required extraction of saliva for DNA profiling
constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the [Fourth] Amendment.”); United States v. Kincade,
379 F.3d 813, 821 n.15 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“The compulsory extraction of blood for DNA
profiling unquestionably implicates the right to personal security embodied in the Fourth
Amendment, and thus constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Constitution.”); Green v.
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that “the taking of a DNA sample is clearly a
search”); Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The
extraction of blood from a prisoner to collect a DNA sample implicates Fourth Amendment
rights.”); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[O]btaining and analyzing the
DNA or saliva of an inmate convicted of a sex offense is a search and seizure implicating Fourth
Amendment concerns . . . .”); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (“It appears to
be established, at least with respect to free persons, that the bodily intrusion resulting from taking
a blood sample constitutes a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.”).
46. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 830–32 n.25 (citing over thirty decisions in which both federal
and state courts have upheld DNA collection statutes, and noting that it could find only two
instances in which courts held such a law unconstitutional).
47. See infra Part I.B.1.
48. See infra Part I.B.2.
49. See infra Part I.B.2.
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state courts were sharply divided on whether DNA collection from arrestees
is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.50
1. Federal Circuits Apply Different Fourth Amendment Tests to
DNA Collection
A majority of federal circuits adopted the Supreme Court’s
reasonableness balancing test for use in DNA collection cases.51 For
example, in United States v. Kincade,52 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit used the balancing analysis to uphold compulsory DNA
profiling of convicted offenders.53 Similarly, in Jones v. Murray,54 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that Virginia legislation
directing the state to take and store the blood of convicted felons for DNA
analysis was constitutional.55 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits followed suit, applying the reasonableness
balancing test to determine the constitutionality of DNA sampling of
convicted persons.56
The minority of courts, namely the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Seventh Circuits, applied the special needs test to uphold the
constitutionality of DNA indexing laws.57 For example, in United States v.
Amerson,58 the Second Circuit upheld a federal law59 requiring DNA
sample collection from any individual convicted of a felony, including
50. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying the balancing
test); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v.
Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006) (same).
52. 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
53. Id. at 836–39.
54. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
55. Id. at 303, 305, 308.
56. See, e.g., Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding a
Georgia statute, which required DNA sampling of all convicted felons, by applying the balancing
test); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184–87 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the balancing
test to determine that collecting DNA from individuals on supervised release is constitutional);
Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 412–14 (5th Cir. 2004) (using the
balancing test to uphold the collection of DNA from prisoners convicted of armed bank robbery
and conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery).
57. See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 655–56, 667 (2d Cir. 2005) (analyzing the
constitutionality of New York’s DNA-database statute, which permitted extraction and analysis of
convicted felons’ blood for DNA-indexing purposes, under the “special needs” test); Green v.
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a Wisconsin statute, which
required persons convicted of felonies to provide DNA samples for storage in a data bank,
satisfied the “special needs” test).
58. 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007).
59. Justice For All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–405, 118 Stat. 2260.
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nonviolent felons who are sentenced only to probation.60 According to the
court, collecting DNA samples to create a DNA index qualifies as a special
need because creating a DNA index “fulfills important purposes that could
not be achieved by reliance on ‘normal’ law enforcement methodology.”61
2. Federal and State Courts Disagree as to Whom DNA Statutes
Apply
Over time, the disagreements surrounding DNA issues increased as
state and federal laws expanded the application of DNA collection laws
from certain dangerous and violent felons, to all convicted people, and
eventually, in some jurisdictions, to arrestees.62 As these laws changed,
courts at both the federal and state levels issued divergent opinions
regarding the constitutionality of requiring arrestees to submit to DNA
collection.63
a. Changing Law: Federal and State Laws Move Toward DNA
Collection from Arrestees
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act (the “Act”),64 allowing the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) to establish and maintain an index of DNA samples
from convicted criminals, crime scenes, and unidentified human remains.65
In response to the Act, the FBI established the Combined DNA Index
System (“CODIS”).66 CODIS allows federal, state, and local forensic
laboratories to share DNA profiles in an attempt to tie evidence from crime

60. Amerson, 483 F.3d at 75.
61. Id. at 82–83.
62. See infra Part I.B.2.a.
63. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
64. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 210304, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
65. See id. (The Director of the FBI has the authority to create “an index of DNA
identification records of (A) persons convicted of crimes; (B) persons who have been charged in
an indictment or information with a crime; and (C) other persons whose DNA samples are
collected under applicable legal authorities, provided that . . . DNA samples that are voluntarily
submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be included in the National DNA Index
System.” The Director may also index the analyses of DNA samples obtained from “crime
scenes,” “unidentified human remains,” and “relatives of missing persons” that are voluntarily
provided).
66. CODIS Brochure, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-brochure-2010 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
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scenes, in which there were no suspects, to DNA samples of convicted
offenders on file in the system.67
Then, in 2000, Congress passed a new program to help clear state
backlogs of DNA samples—the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000 (the “2000 DNA Act”).68 This federal statute approved the collection,
analysis, and indexing of DNA samples from people convicted of federal
crimes, and required convicted felons to submit DNA samples to the
national database.69 The 2000 DNA Act also expanded eligibility for
inclusion in CODIS by requiring federal parolees and probationers to
provide DNA samples.70 Early federal cases such as Jones v. Murray71 and
Roe v. Marcotte72 upheld similar DNA statutes. Today, all fifty states have
passed statutes that require some or all convicted felons to provide a DNA
sample for inclusion in CODIS or state database systems.73
In 2004, Congress passed the Justice for All Act (the “2004 DNA
Act”), which expanded CODIS to include individuals charged with a crime
and, in some circumstances, arrestees.74 The following year, Congress

67. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA
Index System, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometricanalysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
68. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3, 114 Stat.
2726 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 962 F.2d 302, 303, 307–08 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding a Virginia law allowing the
collection and storing of blood of convicted felons for DNA analysis).
72. 193 F.3d 72, 74, 82 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of a Connecticut
statute requiring convicted sex offenders to submit a blood sample for DNA analysis and inclusion
in the DNA databank).
73. DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/collection-from-arrestees.htm.
See also State v.
Raines, 383 Md. 1, 8, 857 A.2d 19, 23 (2004) (“In the last fifteen years, state governments began
to enact DNA collection statutes, and currently all fifty states and the federal government . . . have
some type of DNA collection statute that requires some or all convicted felons to submit a tissue
sample, either blood, saliva or other tissue, for DNA profile analysis and storage in a DNA data
bank.”). In 2004, the Court decided Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, where it
found that a law requiring a person subjected to a Terry stop to identify himself did not violate the
Fourth Amendment; in other words, this person did not have a right to withhold his identity from
police. 542 U.S. 177, 181–82, 187–88 (2004).
74. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260 (amending §
210304 of the DNA Identification Act of 1994 (codified as 42 U.S.C. 14132)). In amending the
prior words “of persons convicted of crimes,” Section 203 (a)(1) inserted the following:
of—(A) persons convicted of crimes; (B) persons who have been charged in an
indictment or information with a crime; and (C) other persons whose DNA samples are
collected under applicable legal authorities, provided that DNA profiles from arrestees
who have not been charged in an indictment or information with a crime, and DNA
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passed the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005,75 which made two key changes.
First, the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 amended Section 3 of the 2000
DNA Act, which only approved collection of DNA from those already
convicted.76 Second, Section 1004 of the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005
permitted the collection of DNA samples from “individuals who are
arrested or from non-United States persons who are detained under the
authority of the United States.”77
b. Variations in Specific State Laws on DNA Collection of
Arrestees
As of June 2012, twenty-eight of the fifty states, in addition to the
federal government, have passed DNA collection laws that permit the
collection of DNA from arrestees.78 These laws differ from each other in
many aspects, including the types of offenses that make arrestees eligible
for DNA collection, the moment at which a sample can be collected or
analyzed, and expungement processes if a charge is dismissed or
exonerated.79 California and Maryland exemplify the variances between
DNA arrestee statutes.
i. California
California’s DNA collection law for arrestees is very broad. Since
2009, California police departments have collected DNA from anyone
arrested for a felony under provisions of Proposition 69, a statewide ballot
measure approved in 2004 that initially applied only to people convicted of
felonies and arrested for certain violent crimes.80 California’s more recent
law allows for DNA collection upon arrest for any felony, including
samples that are voluntarily submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be
included in the National DNA Index System.
75. DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, §§ 1001–1005, 119 Stat. 3084,
3084–86 (2006) (codified in various parts of Sections 18 and 42 of the United States Code). This
Act is also known as Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005.
76. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3, 114 Stat.
2726 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a).
77. DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, supra note 75, § 1004.
78. DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, supra note 73.
79. See infra Parts I.B.2.b.i.–ii.
80. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a)(2)(A)–(B) (West 2013) (mandating law enforcement to
collect DNA samples from “[a]ny adult person who is arrested for or charged with any of the
following felony offenses: (A) Any felony offense . . . or attempt to commit any felony offense . . .
or any felony offense that imposes upon a person the duty to register in California as a sex
offender . . . . (B) Murder or voluntary manslaughter or any attempt to commit murder or
voluntary manslaughter”).
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financial and drug crimes.81 This law also allows law enforcement to
collect and analyze the DNA information, as well as to enter the genetic
evidence into a state data bank.82 If the charge against an arrestee is
ultimately dismissed or the arrestee is exonerated, that person must
affirmatively take action to have his or her genetic profile removed from the
database; expungement is not automatic.83
ii. Maryland
Unlike California, Maryland’s DNA collection law for arrestees (the
“Maryland DNA Collection Act”) allows DNA collection only from
individuals arrested for serious felonies.84 In light of Fourth Amendment
privacy concerns, the Maryland DNA Collection Act (along with three
other state DNA collection laws for arrestees) requires probable cause
before a DNA sample can be analyzed.85 Moreover, Maryland is more
restrictive than states like California in that the Maryland DNA Collection
Act requires the automatic removal of an arrestee’s genetic profile if the
charge against the arrestee is dismissed or exonerated.86 Also, the Maryland
DNA Collection Act does not permit familial searches, wherein law

81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 296.1 (West 2013). Under California law a felony is: “[A] crime
which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. Every other crime or
public offense is a misdemeanor except those offenses that are classified as infraction.” CAL.
PENAL CODE § 17. This DNA law was later found unconstitutional in People v. Buza, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 753, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). The case was eventually transferred to the California
Supreme Court with directions to vacate and reconsider in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Maryland v. King. People v. Buza, 302 P.3d 1051 (Cal. 2013).
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 297 (West 2013).
83. See id. § 299 (noting that a person with “no past or present qualifying offense . . . may
make a written request to have his or her specimen and sample destroyed and searchable database
profile expunged from the data bank” if certain criteria are met).
84. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(3)(i) (West 2013). The statute states that a
DNA sample shall be collected from individuals charged with “a crime of violence or an attempt
to commit a crime of violence” or “burglary or an attempt to commit burglary.” Id.
85. Id.; see also Julie Samuels et al., Collecting DNA From Arrestees: Implementation
Lessons,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
JUSTICE
(June
2012),
available
at
http://www.nij.gov/journals/270/pages/arrestee-dna.aspx (last modified Sept. 18, 2012)
(“[A]rraignment or a judicial probable cause determination is needed for collection in Florida,
Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia; Texas requires an
indictment or waiver of indictment if the arrestee has not been previously convicted of or placed
on deferred adjudication for a qualifying offense. Probable cause is needed for analysis in
Colorado, Maryland, New Mexico (2011) and Utah.”).
86. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(a)(1) (West 2013).
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enforcement uses DNA databases to search for genetic information
indicating a relative of a person they seek to identify.87
c. The Split: Federal and State Courts Diverge as They
Consider DNA Collection from Individuals Who Have Been
Arrested but Not Yet Convicted
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in King, federal and state courts
were split as to the constitutionality of requiring arrestees to submit to DNA
sample collection.88 At the federal level, the Ninth Circuit, in United States
v. Pool,89 upheld the constitutionality of an order requiring the defendant—
who had been arrested, indicted, and detained for a federal felony but not
yet convicted—to provide a DNA sample as a condition of his pretrial
release.90 Similarly, a divided Third Circuit held in United States v.
Mitchell91 that taking a DNA sample from a pretrial arrestee did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.92 The Third Circuit adopted a fingerprint/DNA
analogy, concluding that a DNA profile serves only to identify arrestees and
thus, like fingerprinting, it is an acceptable “routine booking procedure[].”93
A similar divide occurred at the state level. In Anderson v.
Commonwealth,94 the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the
constitutionality of a Virginia law that permitted law enforcement to collect
DNA samples of rape arrestees.95 In contrast, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals in In re Welfare of C.T.L.96 held that Minnesota’s DNA statute

87. Id. § 2-506(d) (“A person may not perform a search of the statewide DNA data base for
the purpose of identification of an offender in connection with a crime for which the offender may
be a biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired.”).
88. Compare Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 851, 858 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining that
the search and seizure of a pretrial detainee’s DNA was unconstitutional), and In re Welfare of
C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that a state statute authorizing
DNA sampling from an individual who has been charged but not yet convicted violates the Fourth
Amendment), with United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding
that a federal statute, which allowed DNA collection from arrestees and pretrial detainees, is
constitutional), and United States v. Thomas, No. 10-CR-6172CJS, 2011 WL 1627321, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2011) (adopting the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the federal DNA
statute was constitutional as applied to an indicted but not convicted person).
89. 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), reh’g granted, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated as
moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011).
90. Id. at 1214–15, 1228.
91. 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011).
92. Id. at 389–90.
93. Id. at 413.
94. 650 S.E.2d 702 (Va. 2007).
95. Id. at 704, 706.
96. 722 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
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authorizing DNA sampling from indicted, but not yet convicted individuals,
violated the Fourth Amendment.97 Similarly, a California appellate court
found the California DNA collection law for arrestees unconstitutional.98
3. Maryland v. King: DNA Collection upon Arrest Is Reasonable
Under the Fourth Amendment
On April 10, 2009, Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested in Wicomico
County, Maryland, on first- and second-degree assault charges.99 During
booking, King’s DNA was collected via buccal swab under the authority of
the Maryland DNA Collection Act.100 On July 13, 2009, King’s DNA
sample was entered into the state’s database.101 While he was awaiting trial
on his assault charges, King’s DNA profile generated a match to a DNA
sample that was collected in a 2003 unsolved rape case in Salisbury,
Maryland.102
The DNA match was presented to a grand jury, which indicted King
for the 2003 rape.103 The grand jury did not consider any other evidence
before returning the indictment, making the DNA match the sole link of
King to that crime.104 Arguing that the Maryland DNA statute was
unconstitutional, King moved to suppress the DNA match.105 The
Maryland Circuit Court for Wicomico County upheld the statute as
constitutional and, after pleading not guilty, King was convicted for the
rape charge and sentenced to life in prison without parole.106
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the Circuit
Court decision, finding the provisions of the Maryland DNA Collection Act
that allowed collection of DNA from felony arrestees to be in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.107 The majority concluded that a DNA swab was
an unreasonable search because King’s “‘expectation of privacy is greater
than the State’s purported interest in using King’s DNA to identify him.’”108

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 486, 491–92.
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); see also supra note 81.
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1965–66.
Id. at 1966.
Id. at 1965.
Id. at 1966.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 561, 42 A.3d 549, 556 (2012)).
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In Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, concluding that “DNA identification of
arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine
booking procedure.”109 Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy
acknowledged the reasonableness balancing test, which weighs the
defendant’s expectation of privacy against the state’s interest in conducting
the search, as the appropriate measure of Fourth Amendment
“reasonableness” under the circumstances.110
Justice Kennedy considered five “legitimate government interest[s]
served by the Maryland DNA Collection Act.”111 These included the need
of law enforcement to: (1) know the identity of the person arrested,
including his or her criminal history;112 (2) know the level of risk the
individual poses to the public;113 (3) “ensur[e] that persons accused of
crimes are available for trials”;114 (4) “prevent[] crime by arrestees”;115 and
(5) “free[] a person wrongfully imprisoned for the same offense.”116
Turning to the individual’s privacy interests, Justice Kennedy opined that a
buccal swab of the inner cheek involves “minimal intrusion.”117
Additionally, “the processing of [King’s] DNA sample’s 13 CODIS loci did
not intrude on [his] privacy in a way that would make his DNA
identification unconstitutional” because “the CODIS loci come from
noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal [] genetic traits” or “private
medical information,” and, even if they did, “they are not in fact tested for
that end.”118
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the Fourth Amendment
categorically prohibits “searching a person for evidence of a crime” without
cause.119 He doubted the majority’s identification rationale, stating clearly
“this search had nothing to do with establishing King’s identity.”120 Finally,
he repudiated the majority’s analogy between DNA collection and
fingerprinting, noting that “fingerprints of arrestees are taken primarily to
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 1980.
Id. at 1970.
Id.
Id. at 1971–72.
Id. at 1972.
Id. at 1972–73 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979)).
Id. at 1973 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987)).
Id. at 1974.
Id. at 1979.
Id.
Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1984.
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identify them” whereas “the DNA of arrestees is taken to solve crimes (and
nothing else).”121
II. ANALYSIS
Today, the federal government and more than half of the Nation’s
states have laws similar to the Maryland DNA Collection Act that permit
the collection of DNA from some or all arrestees.122 The Supreme Court’s
recent ruling in Maryland v. King has important consequences for every
state and for the constitutional privacy rights of all citizens.123 Although the
facts of King left little doubt that the defendant had committed a heinous
crime,124 the Court’s holding that the warrantless collection and processing
of DNA from an arrestee is a constitutional search departs from the
fundamental values originally embodied in the Fourth Amendment.125 As a
result, Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights have been weakened—forced
to take a backseat to the advantages of new technology.126 Unlike searches
of physical places and things, a search of DNA is unique with respect to the
place being searched,127 the physical intrusion needed to effect the search,128
and the amount of data rendered.129 The technology of DNA collection
permits intrusion inside the human body with very limited physical
invasion, but yields aggregated data.130
Instead of applying the
131
reasonableness balancing test in this context —and thereby leaving open
many unresolved questions132—the Court should have looked to a line of
cases that involves problems analogous to DNA collection, such as cases

121. Id. at 1987.
122. Id. at 1968 (majority opinion).
123. See infra Parts II.A–C.
124. Subsequent to his arrest, law enforcement uploaded a sample of King’s DNA to the
Maryland DNA database, which, as a result, produced a match to a DNA sample collected in an
unsolved rape case from 2003. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966. The majority explained the advantages
of DNA identification: “[T]he utility of DNA identification in the criminal justice system is
already undisputed . . . . Future refinements may improve present technology, but even now STR
analysis makes it possible to determine whether a biological tissue matches a suspect with near
certainty.” Id. at 1966–67 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
125. See infra Part II.A.3.
126. See infra Parts II.A.1–3.
127. See infra Part II.A.2.
128. See infra Part II.A.2.
129. See infra Part II.A.3.
130. See infra Part II.A.
131. See infra Part II.A.
132. See infra Part II.B.
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involving searches of data on seized computers.133 By comparing the legal
issues implicated by computer searches to those implicated by DNA
collection, the Court would have found that, similar to searches of seized
computers, the government should be required to obtain a search warrant
before entering an arrestee’s DNA profile into a DNA database to search for
a “hit.”134
A. The King Court Wrongly Applied the Reasonableness Balancing
Test and Thus Did Not Properly Assess the Constitutionality of
DNA Collection and Analysis
While Maryland v. King is the first case in which the Supreme Court
encountered the difficult task of determining the constitutionality of DNA
collection of arrestees,135 it is not the only time the Court has assessed the
impact that advanced technology and intrusions into the body have on
Fourth Amendment rights.136 The facts of King, however, forced the
Supreme Court to consider both issues simultaneously in making its
decision on whether the search of an arrestee by way of collecting and
analyzing his DNA violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches.137 The Court applied the reasonableness balancing
test to determine the reasonableness of such a search “‘by assessing, on the
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests,’”138 taking into account the “‘totality of
the circumstances.’”139 The Court found three factors relevant to its
assessment: (1) the status of the person from whom evidence is gathered;140
(2) the physical intrusion the search entails;141 and (3) the type of evidence
gathered, including the amount of information that evidence is capable of

133. See infra Part II.C.
134. See infra Part II.C.
135. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013) (“[T]he DNA swab procedure used here
presents a question the Court has not yet addressed . . . .”).
136. See supra Parts I.A–B.
137. Id.
138. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). For a more detailed discussion on the reasonableness balancing test
and other cases where the Court has applied this test, see supra Part I.A.
139. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).
140. See infra Part II.A.1.
141. See infra Part II.A.2.
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revealing.142 The Court’s assessment of these three factors undervalued an
arrestee’s privacy interests and the protection of privacy interests in general.
1. Arrestee Status
Since 2000, the Supreme Court has twice applied the reasonableness
balancing test in Fourth Amendment cases involving individuals serving
post-conviction punishments: addressing the issue of probationers in United
States v. Knights143 and, more recently, the issue of parolees in Samson v.
California.144 In these cases, the Court explained that a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy depends on the level of freedom that person enjoys
in society.145 People under state control—including prisoners, probationers,
and parolees—exist on a “‘continuum’ of state-imposed punishments,” and
thus are accorded more limited privacy than free citizens.146 The Samson
Court explained that “[o]n this continuum, parolees have fewer expectations
of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment
than probation is to imprisonment.”147 What is alarming about the Court’s
privacy analysis in King is its implication that arrestees, by virtue of their
status alone, belong somewhere on this continuum.148 In placing arrestees
on this continuum, the Court considered the diminished expectations of
privacy associated with being arrested and effectively suggested that a

142. See infra Part II.A.3.
143. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
144. 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
145. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119–20 (“The probation condition thus significantly diminished
Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy.”). But see id. at 120 n.6 (“We do not decide whether
the probation condition so diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights’ reasonable expectation
of privacy . . . that a search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion
would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). The Court in
Samson, however, ruled on this specific issue and held that it does, stating:
We granted certiorari . . . to answer a variation of the question this Court left open in
United States v. Knights . . . whether a condition of release can so diminish or eliminate
a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search by a
law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment. Answering that
question in the affirmative today, we affirm the judgment of the California Court of
Appeal.
Samson, 547 U.S. at 847.
146. Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 119).
147. Id.
148. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013) (“The expectations of privacy of an
individual taken into police custody ‘necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.’” (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979))).
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search via collection and analysis of DNA is less invasive on an arrestee’s
privacy as opposed to the privacy of a free citizen.149
There are two groups of people that are directly affected by laws that
authorize the collection of DNA upon arrest: those who are found guilty of
the crime and those who are found not guilty. Because DNA collection and
analysis is already permitted for those convicted of certain crimes,150 DNA
laws concerning arrestees do not expand current law enforcement
investigative capabilities for the former group. Thus, the real target of
DNA laws concerning arrestees is the latter group—those who are
ultimately found not guilty. This fact is what distinguishes arrestees from
probationers and parolees and what weakens the validity of the King
Court’s reliance on the continuum and the diminished expectation of
privacy theories set out in cases such as Knights and Samson.
There is a second plausible way the situation in King might be
distinguished from the Court’s rulings in Samson and Knights. In Samson,
an officer who was aware of Samson’s parolee status searched him without
any specific suspicion that Samson had committed a crime.151 Affirming
the reasoning in Knights and ultimately finding the search reasonable, the
Court found “salient” the requirement that probationers and parolees be
clearly and unambiguously informed of their search conditions and
concluded that awareness of such conditions removed a legitimate
expectation of privacy.152 In these cases, both Samson and Knights
consented to suspicionless searches and were unambiguously aware of what
consent meant, facts that the Court found important and weighed heavily in
its application of the reasonableness balancing test.153
In King, however, the Court made no mention of consent. If consent
were so critical in weighing the privacy expectation interest in Samson and
Knights, surely the fact that arrestees have no say in whether they want their
DNA collected can, at the very minimum, weigh in favor of the individual
privacy interests side of the balancing test. The King Court, however, failed
to address this issue—an example of how the reasonableness balancing test
allows the Court to pick and choose what it deems pertinent to the privacy
interests analysis.
149. Id.
150. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
151. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 846–47 (“[P]ursuant to Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3067(a) . . . and
based solely on petitioner’s status as a parolee, Officer Rohleder searched petitioner.”).
152. Id. at 852 (“In Knights, we found that acceptance of a clear and unambiguous search
condition ‘significantly diminished Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (quoting United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001))).
153. Id. at 850–52.

2014]

MARYLAND v. KING

685

2. The Physical Intrusion
In addition to status, the King Court also found the degree of physical
intrusion involved in the collection of DNA relevant to its overall
assessment of the scope of individual privacy interests.154 One significant
characteristic of DNA technology is its ability to invade privacy in a less
physically intrusive way.155 Indeed, King is not the first time the Court has
been confronted with technological innovations implicating constitutional
privacy rights in this manner.156 For example, in Kyllo v. United States,157
despite the lack of a physical invasion, the Court required a warrant to use
thermal imaging to measure heat escaping from a house.158 Because the
government had not obtained a warrant, the Court found the search
unconstitutional.159
Similar to the minimal invasion required to perform thermal imaging
of a house, a DNA buccal swab of the inner cheek also involves minimal
physical intrusion. In fact, a buccal swab is substantially less intrusive than
other types of approved intrusions to which arrestees are routinely
subjected.160 Yet, the Court in Kyllo found the use of a thermal imaging
device from a public vantage point to monitor the radiation of heat from a
home constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,

154. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013).
155. The collection of DNA via buccal swab “requires the collector to swab up-and-down and
rotate a sterile cotton swab on the interior of the cheek in the subject’s mouth, with enough
pressure to remove cells.” King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 557 n.5, 42 A.2d 549, 553 n.5 (2012),
rev’d. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). The process of drawing blood requires the skin
to be pierced and a foreign object to be inserted into the body for “a perceptible amount of time.”
Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1059, reh’g granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (deciding whether attachment
of Global-Positioning-System “GPS” tracking device on a vehicle, and subsequent use of GPS
device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, is a lawful search); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (deciding whether warrantless use of thermal imaging device to
measure heat emanating from home without physically invading the house is a lawful search);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (involving technology enabling human flight, that
is, the airplane, which allowed public view of uncovered portions of the house and its curtilage
that once were private); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (explaining that even
though a listening device attached to the outside of a public telephone booth and used to
eavesdrop on defendant inside the telephone booth “did not happen to penetrate the wall of the
booth,” this alone, “can have no constitutional significance”).
157. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
158. Id. at 40–41.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (describing the low level of
physical intrusion that results from a blood test).
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thereby requiring a search warrant.161 The Court in King, however, found
that a DNA swab does not require a search warrant.162
This reasoning begs the question: why is it that the Court finds
privacy, secrecy, and autonomy within the four walls of the home
paramount, but does not hold intrusion into the human body to as high of a
standard?163 Why is it that when a person is lawfully arrested within the
home, the government does not have the unrestricted authority to search the
entire home, without probable cause, for evidence of other unrelated
crimes,164 but the government may do so with the body? The Court offers
no satisfying answer. Instead of requiring a warrant as it did in Kyllo, the
Court in King applied the reasonableness balancing test, using the reduced
physical intrusion on privacy as part of the justification for a government
search that otherwise would not be permitted. As a result, the two
competing interests in the reasonableness balancing test—individual
privacy and the government’s need for the intrusion—transform into
dependent variables.165 As professor and author Scott E. Sundby explained,
“the government’s ability to intrude in a less physically intrusive manner
does not promote privacy interests but actually undermines the overall right
to be free from government surveillance by expanding the scope of
acceptable intrusions.”166
Thus, while the Court continues to insist on strong justifications and
prior judicial approval for police intrusion inside the home,167 it did not
guard the expectations of privacy into the body as zealously as it should
161. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
162. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
163. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“But when it comes to the Fourth
Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of
a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”
(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))); Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 101–02 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I doubt whether [a probationer’s] reasonable
expectation of privacy in his home [is] any less than petitioners’ reasonable expectation of privacy
in their urine taken, or in the urine tests performed . . . .”).
164. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335–37 (1990) (limiting warrantless searches of the
home in in-home arrests to a “protective sweep,” which must “be justified by probable cause to
believe that a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger existed”).
165. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, in THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 297, 301 (Cynthia Lee ed., 2011)
(“[M]inimizing the level of the privacy intrusion can help compensate for a weaker government
justification, such as one lacking individualized suspicion.”).
166. Id.
167. See United States v. Kyllo, 553 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“We have said that the Fourth
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house . . . .’” (quoting Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980))).
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have. Instead, the Court allowed the breadth of Fourth Amendment
protection to recede in the presence of innovative technology that, while
minimally physically invasive, is just as much a violation of Fourth
Amendment rights.
3. The Type of Evidence
Some federal and state courts view DNA collection and analysis from
arrestees as a process that involves two separate “searches” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.168 The first search is the physical
intrusion caused by running the swab against the inner cheek (“first
search”).169 The second search is the processing and analysis of the DNA
sample (“second search”).170 The King Court provided insufficient
consideration of this latter search. While the first search may be minimally
physically intrusive, it is the second search that conflicts with Fourth
Amendment privacy interests.171 In its brief discussion of the privacy
interests involved in the second search, the Court in King cites safeguards
built within the Maryland DNA Collection Act:
[T]he processing of [King’s] DNA sample’s 13 CODIS loci did
not intrude on [his] privacy in a way that would make his DNA
identification unconstitutional. First . . . the CODIS loci come
from noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic
traits of the arrestee. . . . And even if non-coding alleles could
provide some information, they are not in fact tested for that end.
It is undisputed that law enforcement officers analyze DNA for
the sole purpose of generating a unique identifying number
against which future samples may be matched. . . . Finally, the
Act provides statutory protections that guard against further
invasion of privacy. . . . [T]he Act requires that “[o]nly DNA
records that directly relate to the identification of individuals shall
be collected and stored.” No purpose other than identification is
permissible . . . .
In light of the scientific and statutory
safeguards, once [King’s] DNA was lawfully collected, the STR
analysis of [King’s] DNA pursuant to CODIS procedures did not
168. See King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 594, 42 A.3d 549, 575 (2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1958
(2013) (“As other courts have concluded, we look at any DNA collection effort as two discrete
and separate searches. The first search is the actual swab of the inside of [the arrestee’s] mouth
and the second is the analysis of the DNA sample thus obtained, a step required to produce the
DNA profile.”).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 609 (W.D. Pa. 2009), rev’d, 652 F.3d
387 (3d Cir. 2011) (agreeing that the physical intrusion of the body implicated by the buccal swab
is not greatly intrusive, but it is the searching of the DNA that is cause for alarm).
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amount to a significant invasion of privacy that would render the
DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment.172
While discussing these safeguards, the Court acknowledged the
possibility for abuse,173 but skirted the privacy issue implicated by the
second search. Disregarding its emphasis on the scope of privacy rights in
cases leading up to King,174 the Court ultimately undervalued Fourth
Amendment privacy rights.
Privacy is not just about personal privacy; it includes the right to
informational privacy, personal autonomy, peace of mind, and feeling safe
from government invasion.175 Indeed, Justice Sotomayor, concurring in
United States v. Jones, advocated that the “unique attributes of GPS
surveillance” be taken into account when considering reasonable societal
172. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979–80 (2013) (citation omitted) (quoting Vernonia
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995)).
173. Id. at 1979 (“While science can always progress further, and those progressions may have
Fourth Amendment consequences, alleles at the CODIS loci ‘are not at present revealing
information beyond identification.’ . . . The argument that the testing at issue in this case reveals
any private medical information at all is open to dispute.” (citation omitted)). The Court added,
however, “[i]f in the future police analyze samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee’s
predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity, that case
would present additional privacy concerns not present here.” Id.
174. For example, in Schmerber v. California, the Court held that the unconsented,
warrantless blood test for assessment of alcohol concentration was constitutional because “[t]he
officer . . . might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which
the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the ‘destruction of
evidence.’” 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (citation omitted). Blood alcohol decreases with time, the
Court explained, and because there was no time to seek a warrant, these “special facts” permitted
bypass of the warrant requirement. Id. at 770–71. In concluding its opinion, the Schmerber Court
left no ambiguity:
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent an
emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are
concerned. . . . The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of
the issue whether or not to invade another’s body in search of evidence of guilt is
indisputable and great.
....
We thus conclude that the present record shows no violation of petitioner’s right
under the Fourth [Amendment] . . . . [W]e reach this judgment only on the facts of the
present record. The integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value of our
society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor
intrusions into an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no way
indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other
conditions.
Id. at 770–72 (emphasis added).
175. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6 (2012) (“[T]he [Fourth] [A]mendment offers a
guarantee not merely of secrecy but of personal autonomy.”).
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expectations of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.176 Jones
was ultimately decided on common law trespass theory177 and did not
require the Court to answer the more complex issue of what would happen
in a situation where the electronic monitoring did not require a physical
trespass.178 The King Court, however, essentially provided the answer to
this scenario in the context of DNA collection because the same problems
that Justice Sotomayor recognized in Jones are manifest in King. As Justice
Sotomayor explained:
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations. . . . The Government can store such records and
efficiently mine them for information years into the future. And
because GPS monitoring . . . by design, proceeds surreptitiously,
it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: “limited police resources and community
hostility.”
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of
identity is susceptible to abuse.
The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at
a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate
information about any person whom the Government, in its
unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may “alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is
inimical to democratic society.”179
These problems highlighted in Jones parallel the problems associated
with the collection of DNA from arrestees. While the scope of DNA data is
restricted because it is not collected from anyone other than arrestees or

176. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In Jones, the
Court held that government attachment of a GPS tracking device to Jones’s vehicle, and
subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, was a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 948–49 (majority opinion).
177. Id. at 949–52. The Court explains why the government’s actions constituted a trespass:
“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”
Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 954 (“It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without an
accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not
require us to answer that question.”).
179. Id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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others associated with the state (such as probationers and parolees),180
DNA’s exceptional nature contains information on “physical characteristics
and traits, genetic disorders, susceptibility to disease and ethnic origin.”181
Although the Maryland DNA Collection Act includes limitations on the use
of DNA to mitigate the impact on personal privacy,182 it still affects an
individual’s right to retain control or have oversight of the data or material
taken from his or her body. This concept not only goes against the Fourth
Amendment’s protection of personal privacy, but also personal autonomy
because it intrudes on an individual’s interest in security and freedom.183
By authorizing the collection and processing of DNA upon arrest, the
King decision effectively allows unreasonable governmental intrusions that
“unjustifiably disturb our peace of mind and our capacity to thrive as
independent citizens in a vibrant democratic society.”184 If the Court were
to conduct a proper reasonableness balancing test, it should take into
account these important interests.
B. Consequences and Loose Ends of King
The Supreme Court’s decision in King has significant Fourth
Amendment implications that extend beyond the case itself. It leaves open
unresolved questions and subjects certain classes of individuals to the risk
of law enforcement abuse.
1. Broad Implications for Broad Statutes
In his dissent in King, Justice Scalia noted that the majority decision
was very broad; he warned that because of “today’s decision, your DNA
can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you are ever
arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”185 Compared to the
Maryland DNA Collection Act, DNA collection laws in states like
California are much broader and, therefore, raise more questions given the

180. Although, as discussed in more detail supra, the collection and entering of arrestee DNA
into a database system may compromise the privacy of related biological family members. See
supra Part II.B.3.
181. See Liz Campbell, A Rights-Based Analysis of DNA Retention: “Non-Conviction”
Databases and the Liberal State, 12 CRIM. L. REV. 889, 891 (2010) (exploring the human rights
implications of DNA retention).
182. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979–80 (2013) (“[T]he Act requires that ‘[o]nly
DNA records that directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.’”
(quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1))).
183. See supra text accompanying note 176.
184. SCHULHOFER, supra note 175, at 6.
185. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Court’s broad ruling in King. For example, in Haskell v. Harris,186 the
Ninth Circuit heard arguments challenging California’s DNA collection law
but suspended consideration of the case when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in King.187 The California statute, as discussed supra,188 is unlike
the Maryland DNA Collection Act in that it does not provide for automatic,
mandatory expungement of the DNA profile if the arrestee is acquitted or
the charges are dismissed;189 nor does it limit DNA collection to individuals
arrested for serious felonies.190 If the Ninth Circuit were to permit the
collection of DNA from individuals arrested pursuant to the California
DNA collection law, would it be a greater violation of Californians’ Fourth
Amendment rights?
While the King Court mentions Maryland’s automatic expungement
provision, it does not stress this provision or include it in its balancing of
privacy and government interests.191 Because federally assigned rights are
the minimum that each state must follow,192 the Court’s decision in King
may suggest that DNA collection laws in states such as California, which
contain less restrictive provisions on government collection of DNA in their
statutes, are unconstitutional. Thus, while states need not change their
statute to mirror the Maryland DNA Collection Act immediately, their
statute may be challenged on the ground that the less restrictive process of
collecting DNA, as opposed to Maryland’s process, affords less rights.
2. Aggravating the Pretext Problem
The Court in King agreed on certain facts: (1) King’s DNA was
obtained without a warrant pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act;
(2) King was indicted for rape only after the DNA evidence was presented
186. 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012).
187. Order for Publication at 1–2, Haskell v. Harris, No. 10-15152 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013)
(decision pending following en banc reargument on December 9, 2013).
188. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
189. See supra note 86. Provisions such as automatic expungement are especially important
to Fourth Amendment rights because when a DNA profile is allowed to remain in a database
system, it is subject to multiple searches in the future. DNA, that remains in the database even
after the arrestee is acquitted or the charges against him are dropped, leaves open the ability for
law enforcement to investigate and resolve crimes that an individual in the database has yet to
commit.
190. See supra note 84.
191. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013).
192. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in
relevant part: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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to a grand jury; and (3) no individualized suspicion existed that a search of
King’s DNA would reveal evidence of the crime for which he was
arrested.193 Indeed, the facts of King do not place it into one of the clear
categories of cases where the Court has found warrantless searches
constitutional: stop and frisk,194 automobile,195 consent of a third party,196
exigent circumstances,197 and special needs.198 The Court, however, had
one tool left: the reasonableness balancing test. The Court seemed to have
forgotten the reasoning behind the warrant requirement in the first place,
which the Court clearly set out in McDonald v. United States199:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search
warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency,
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals . . . .
It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to
invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of
privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of
criminals . . . .
We cannot be true to that constitutional
requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a
193. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965–66. Law enforcement only obtained a search warrant
subsequent to the first match, so that they might take a second sample of DNA from King. Id. at
1966.
194. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (holding “that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
195. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1991) (holding that even though
law enforcement did not have probable cause to search the automobile as a whole, where they had
probable cause to believe only that a container within the automobile had contraband or evidence,
officers were permitted to search the container and did not need to hold the container pending
issuance of a search warrant).
196. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179, 181, 183–84 (1990) (holding that a
warrantless entry is permissible when based upon the consent of a third party whom law
enforcement, at the time of entry, reasonably believes to possess common authority over the
premises, but who in fact does not).
197. See, e.g, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50–52 (1970) (discussing when the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement is applicable).
198. See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648, 664–65 (1995)
(upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless, suspicionless random drug testing program
required for students participating in high school or grade school interscholastic athletics).
199. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
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showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative.200
By somehow linking the probable cause of one crime and making it
justifiable to search for evidence for a separate, unrelated crime,201 the
Court has aggravated the pretext problem—a problem that has concerned
the Court throughout its history of deciding Fourth Amendment issues.202
For example, the law on searches incident to arrest has long been criticized
because of the possibility of officer abuse.203 It is easy for an officer to find
a reason to stop someone in their vehicle for a traffic violation,204 and, after
the Court’s decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,205 officers have
discretion as to whether they will make an arrest, even for misdemeanor
offenses.206
DNA collection upon arrest is less justifiable than the typical search
incident to arrest because the Court has only allowed the latter under the
justification of officer safety and preservation of evidence.207 The Court in

200. Id. at 455–56.
201. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (“The arrestee is already in valid police
custody for a serious offense supported by probable cause.”). The Court added that “[w]hen
probable cause exists to remove an individual from the normal channels of society and hold him in
legal custody, DNA identification plays a critical role in serving those interests.” Id. at 1971.
202. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“There is always the possibility that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search
warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search.”); see also Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (discussing how motivation and competition for “ferreting out
crime” can pressure police to circumvent the law).
203. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248 (“[I]n most jurisdictions and for most traffic offenses the
determination of whether to issue a citation or effect a full arrest is discretionary with the officer.
There is always the possibility that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search
warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search.”).
204. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 156 (5th ed. 2012) (“‘[V]ery few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance
without violating some traffic regulation’ . . . . It is apparent that virtually everyone who ventures
out onto the public streets and highways may then, with little effort by the police, be placed in a
position where he is subject to a full search. . . . [I]t is clear that this subterfuge is employed as a
means for searching for evidence on the persons of suspects who could not be lawfully arrested
for the crimes of which they are suspected.” (quoting B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 65 (1969))).
205. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
206. Id. at 323.
207. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is
reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in
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United States v. Robinson left the pretext issue “for another day,”208 and the
King Court decided that day had not yet arrived.209
3. Familial Searches
Familial searching, which remains an unresolved issue after King,
opens the door to another form of law enforcement abuse. A familial search
is “an additional search of a law enforcement DNA database conducted
after a routine search has been completed and no profile matches are
identified during the process.”210 Occasionally, routine DNA searches
produce partial match profiles.211 Familial searching, however, is when law
enforcement “deliberate[ly] search[es] a DNA database [] for the intended
purpose of potentially identifying close biological relatives to the unknown
forensic profile obtained from crime scene evidence.”212 This type of
searching “is based on the concept that first order relatives . . . will have
more genetic data in common than unrelated individuals” and would only
be used “if the comparison of the forensic DNA profile with the known
offender/arrestee DNA profiles has not identified any matches to any of the
offenders/arrestees.”213
While the ability of DNA to allow for “familial searches” obviously
makes DNA collection very different from fingerprinting,214 the Court in
King alarmingly placed much weight on the similarities between DNA
collection and fingerprinting to reach the conclusion that collection of
arrestees’ DNA is constitutional.215 Because of the unique nature of DNA,
however, free citizens may be implicated when an arrestee’s DNA
information is entered into a DNA database system and compared using
familial searches.
order to prevent its concealment or destruction . . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a
search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control.’”).
208. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221 n.1.
209. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013).
210. Familial Searching, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/familial-searching (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See JENNIFER LYNCH, FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN
U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND 7 (2012) (“DNA presents privacy issues different
from those involved in other biometrics collection. . . . [I]t can contain information about a
person’s entire genetic make-up, including gender, familial relationships . . . .”).
215. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977 (2013) (“DNA identification of arrestees, of the
type approved by the Maryland statute here at issue, is ‘no more than an extension of methods of
identification long used in dealing with persons under arrest.’” (citation omitted)).
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Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the Maryland DNA Collection Act
explicitly prohibits familial DNA searches.216 As of 2011, however, several
states allow familial searching, including California, Colorado, Texas, and
Virginia.217 California notoriously caught the “Grim Sleeper” serial killer
after taking a DNA sample from his son.218 King seems to suggest that
familial searches in this context would be unconstitutional; however, the
King Court declined to further explore the familial search issue.219
For people in states that do allow familial searches, any time an
arrested family member’s cheek is swabbed and their DNA is archived, so
too is information related to the family member. It is essentially like
creating a “gene for criminality.” If your father is a criminal, his DNA
profile will be in the national database; and because you share half of your
DNA with your father,220 your DNA now can be more easily identified,
increasing your chances of being accused, and possibly convicted, of a
crime.
Now that the Court has ruled on this issue, it is the responsibility of the
states to protect citizens from potential abuse such as familial searching and
arresting on pretext.221 That responsibility, however, is misplaced and
should not be left to the discretion of individual states—protection from
Fourth Amendment violations is within the purview of the federal
government and should be a right equally protected for all.
C. DNA and Computers: How Far the Government Can Plausibly Go
Without Violating the Fourth Amendment
What, then, could have been a better solution to prevent the vast
broadening of the Fourth Amendment the Court effectively accomplished
with its ruling in King? Given that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
regarding searches of DNA is fairly undeveloped,222 a similar model to turn
to is how courts have dealt with searches of seized computers. A strong
analogy might be drawn between computer data and DNA information:
216. Id. at 1967 (“Tests for familial matches are also prohibited.”).
217. Familial Searching, supra note 210.
218. Lauren Sher & Neal Karlinsky, New Technique of Using Family’s DNA Led Police to
‘Grim Sleeper’ Suspect, ABCNEWS.COM (July 8, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/familysdna-led-police-grim-sleeper-serial-killer/story?id=11116381.
219. See supra note 216.
220. See Campbell, supra note 181 (“An individual’s DNA . . . is inherited from both one’s
parents.”).
221. See supra Part II.B.2.
222. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013) (“[T]he DNA swab procedure used here
presents a question the Court has not yet addressed . . . .”).
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DNA searches are conducted via government technology, and DNA
samples contain vast amounts of personal information in a very small
amount of space.223 Similar to what occurs when a computer is seized and
then searched at a later time, relevant DNA information cannot be separated
from irrelevant information at the site of the search, so the government has
no choice but to take it all.224 Additionally, computer and DNA database
searches threaten the same type of government abuse, such as exploratory
searches into personal information that are detached from law
enforcement’s original suspicions for arrest.225
Rather than understand the process of collecting and entering an
arrestee’s DNA into a database as two distinct searches—the physical swab
and the analysis of the DNA sample—the DNA collection effort could be
broken down into three steps that may or may not be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment: (1) the physical collection of the DNA sample; (2) the
creation of the DNA profile from the DNA sample; and (3) the inclusion of
the DNA profile within CODIS, or any other database, so that it can be
searched for a possible “hit.”
The second step of creating the DNA profile is arguably not a search
under the Fourth Amendment, and, therefore, the creation of a DNA profile
may be constitutional.226 While step one does constitute a Fourth
Amendment search, it does not address the more grave constitutional
problem of unreasonableness as seen in step three; one can plausibly assert
that taking a DNA buccal swab and creating a profile from the sample is
constitutional,227 yet inclusion of the DNA profile within CODIS, and the
unfettered ability to search for a “hit” within that database, cannot be said to
be a reasonable search.228
For these reasons, the King Court should have required the
government to obtain a search warrant before entering an arrestee’s DNA
sample into a DNA database to search for a “hit,” just as courts have

223. Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When DNA Collected for One
Purpose is Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (2011).
224. Id.
225. Catherine W. Kimel, DNA Profiles, Computer Searches, and the Fourth Amendment, 62
DUKE L.J. 933, 968 (2013) (“CODIS searches are, in essence, general-warrant computer searches
turned on their head: Instead of searching a single computer for evidence of any and every crime,
DNA matching searches any and every CODIS subject for evidence of one particular crime (times
one hundred thousand, every day).”).
226. See infra Part II.C.1.
227. See infra Part II.A.2.
228. See infra Part II.C.2.
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required a search warrant for post-seizure computer searches.229 As with
warrants in other contexts, a DNA warrant could be issued upon a showing
of probable cause to believe that the specific DNA profile the government
wishes to compare its sample against will produce evidence of the crime
under investigation.
1. Beginning With Step Two: The Creation of an InformationLimited DNA Profile from the Information-Rich DNA Sample
As mentioned supra, the second “search” may not violate the Fourth
Amendment, not because it is a reasonable search, but because it arguably is
not a search at all.230 In his article Searches and Seizures in a Digital
World, Professor Orin S. Kerr explored the ways in which the Fourth
Amendment applies to the search and seizure of computer data and
questioned when a search occurs during the retrieval of information from a
computer hard drive.231 According to Professor Kerr, “a search occurs
when information from or about the data is exposed to possible human
observation, such as when it appears on a screen, rather than when it is
copied by the hard drive or processed by the computer.”232 Professor Kerr
found support in United States v. Karo,233 a Supreme Court case in which
the defendant was being investigated as part of a narcotics conspiracy and
received cans of ether, one of which contained a police-placed transmitter
intended to help track the defendant’s movements.234 The Court determined
that merely placing the transmitter in an ether can transferred to the
defendant was not a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because the
transmitter was not used to convey information to the police.235

229. See infra Part II.C.2.
230. See supra Part II.A.2. I begin with the second search because it is well-established that
the first search—the buccal swab technique—is a reasonable search that does not violate the
Fourth Amendment. See supra Part II.A.2.
231. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 532, 534–35
(2005) (listing “four basic differences between the dynamics of traditional home searches and the
new computer searches” and “how the Fourth Amendment applies to the data acquisition stage of
computer searches”).
232. Id. at 551. Kerr provided three arguments to support his reasoning: “First, focusing on
the exposure of data most accurately transfers our physical world notions of searches to the
context of computers. . . . Second, the exposure-based approach reinforces the traditional Fourth
Amendment concern with limiting the scope of searches. . . . Third, the exposure-based approach
proves much easier to administer than the alternatives.” Id. at 551–52.
233. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
234. Id. at 708–10; see Kerr, supra note 231, at 553–54 (discussing Karo).
235. Karo, 468 U.S. at 712.
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Professor Kerr found further support in Arizona v. Hicks.236 In Hicks,
a law enforcement officer was searching an apartment and saw valuable
stereo pieces.237 Suspicious that the stereo was stolen, he wrote down the
serial numbers of some of the pieces.238 The Court held that merely
copying these serial numbers did not constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure.239
Similar to copying serial numbers or computer data contained in a hard
drive, DNA information is “copied” from a DNA sample, and a limited
form of the sample creates the DNA profile.240 A DNA profile that is not
entered into CODIS or a state DNA database is useless to law enforcement
and provides them with no valuable information.241 Therefore, if Professor
Kerr is correct that mere copying of information is not subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny, this suggests that the action of creating a DNA profile
by copying data from a DNA sample should also not be subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny.
It follows then that law enforcement may create a legal DNA profile
from the sample. Furthermore, the DNA profile arguably represents only a
limited copy of the original DNA sample, as the profile excludes a “genetic
treasure map.”242 Similar to the mere copying information discussed by
Professor Kerr, creating a limited DNA profile is helpful for law
enforcement purposes and may have a plausible legal argument to support
constitutionality.
2.

Step Three: Inclusion of the DNA Profile in the CODIS
Database

While law enforcement may be permitted to legally collect an
arrestee’s DNA sample and create a limited DNA profile out of that sample,
law enforcement should not be able to immediately submit the DNA profile
236. 480 U.S. 321 (1987); see Kerr, supra note 231, at 558 (discussing Hicks).
237. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 324.
240. Caitlin Smith, et al., DNA Goes to Court 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1047, 1047–48
(2012) (explaining that, out of the billions of base pairs in the human genome, the FBI chooses
particular base pairs to include in a DNA profile).
241. For example, in King v. State, law enforcement did not benefit from merely collecting
King’s DNA but rather from entering the DNA sample in the database bank and getting a “hit.”
425 Md. 550, 557, 42 A.3d 549, 553 (2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
242. Id. at 549, 42 A.3d at 577 (“A DNA sample, obtained through a buccal swab, contains
within it unarguably much more than a person’s identity. Although the Maryland DNA Collection
Act restricts the DNA profile to identifying information only, we can not turn a blind eye to the
vast genetic treasure map that remains in the DNA sample retained by the State.”).
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to CODIS, or any other DNA database system, to search for a “hit” because
allowing this opens the door to unrestricted searches and the potential for
constitutional violations. According to Professor Kerr, “[j]ust as an
individual generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home
and his packages, so too should he have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of his personal hard drive.”243 Likewise, arrestees should
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained
within their DNA.
There is a significant distinction between the moment when the DNA
sample is collected (and a limited DNA profile is created by the
government), and the moment when the profile is entered into a DNA
database, thereby initiating a search for a “hit.” Once entered, the DNA
profile is capable of producing incriminating information if a matching
profile exists in the system.244 Thus, while law enforcement may be able to
collect the DNA of arrestees and have the limited DNA profile in their
possession, entering the limited DNA profile into the database should only
be allowed in the presence of a search warrant. This prohibition would
properly address commentators’ legitimate concerns that law enforcement
might abuse their authority if they are allowed to include arrestees’ samples
in the database.245 To be sure, although entering an arrestee’s DNA profile
into CODIS to search for a “hit” may help law enforcement, constitutional
rights cannot be ignored. Thus, to protect these rights, law enforcement
should be required to obtain a search warrant before entering an arrestee’s
DNA profile into CODIS.
III. CONCLUSION
When compared to the amount of emphasis the King Court placed on
governmental interests, the time the Court spent on the privacy interests
side of the reasonableness balancing test is unfortunately diminutive. The
Court’s ultimate finding after application of the reasonableness balancing
test lessened the scope of protection of privacy rights for us all and has left
the door open for government abuse.246 Requiring law enforcement to wait
to enter an arrestee’s DNA profile into a DNA database until they obtain a
search warrant would allow the government to continue to make use of the
243. Kerr, supra note 231, at 549.
244. See supra note 67.
245. See, e.g., Ashley Eiler, Note, Arrested Development: Reforming the Federal All-Arrestee
DNA Collection Statute to Comply with the Fourth Amendment, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1201,
1226 (2010) (discussing the possibility that police might conduct warrantless arrests with the
purpose of collecting DNA to verify a “hunch”).
246. See supra Part II.A–B.
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extraordinary capability and utility of DNA technology, without violating
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.247
Careful consideration of the extent to which DNA may be used is
imperative not only for various privacy interests and rights afforded by the
Fourth Amendment, but also because there is no other constitutional right
that would protect our interest in our own genetic material.248 While DNA
technology’s enhancement of investigative capabilities is extraordinary, as
is its ability to help solve crimes in a quick, accurate way, the cost of police
intrusion into personal liberty is too high to allow collection and processing
of DNA upon arrest of those presumed to be innocent.249

247. See supra Part II.C.2.
248. The Supreme Court has made clear numerous times that the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination does not extend to the collection of DNA, blood, or fingerprints in
connection with a criminal case. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760–65 (1966)
(rejecting Schmerber’s claim that withdrawal of his blood and admission into evidence of the
analysis that indicated intoxication was not inadmissible on Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination grounds because the privilege only protects “testimony [and] evidence relating
to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner”); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958,
1975 (2013) (“And though the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination is not, as
a general rule, governed by a reasonableness standard, the Court has held that ‘questions . . .
reasonably related to the police’s administrative concerns . . . fall outside the protections of
Miranda and the answers thereto need not be suppressed.’” (citations omitted)).
249. Justice Stevens might agree. As he eloquently, but succinctly, explained in Bell v.
Wolfish, “the easiest course for [law enforcement] officials is not always one that our Constitution
allows them to take.” 441 U.S. 520, 595 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

